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The many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum theory asserts that
the universe can be represented by a deterministically- and unitarily-evolving
quantum state. A major challenge to this interpretation has been the jus-
tification of the values, and even of the meaning, of the probabilities which
are predicted by the Born rule and which are in such magnificent agreement
with all observations. Some time ago, David Deutsch [1] suggested that de-
cision theory could provide this needed justification, by leading to what I
shall call the decision-theoretic Born Rule, and abbreviate as DTBR. This
rule, (as formulated in [2]), is
Decision-theoretic Born Rule: A rational agent who knows
that the Born-rule weight of an outcome is p is rationally com-
pelled to act as if that outcome had probability p.
In a series of papers, David Wallace [2, and references therein] has elab-
orated upon Deutsch’s suggestion; I shall refer to the attempt to establish
the DTBR as the D-W program. Two of the recent critics of this program
are Price [3] and Kent [4], where references to earlier critical papers2 can be
found.
In this note I comment on the most recent paper by Wallace [2]. After a
very brief review of the D-W program as pursued in [2], I will describe three
different possible agents whom I will call the Egalitarian, the Optimist, and
the Stoic. I will argue that each of them should be considered to be acting
rationally, although none of them will obey the DTBR. The first two of
these agents will violate at least one of the axioms of rationality adopted
by Wallace in [2]; of course I am hoping that the conclusion the reader will
draw from this is not that these agents are, after all, irrational, but rather
that Wallace’s axioms are too strong. The third agent will respect all of the
axioms of ref. [2], but nevertheless will not obey the DTBR.
The D-W program: Consider an ”agent” who is offered the choice of
several ”games”. Each game will consist of a (quantum) event with several
possible outcomes, after which the agent will receive a ”reward” depending
on the outcome of the event. I will write ri for the reward given to the
agent following the ith outcome, and V(ri) for the value the agent places
on receiving ri. For the agents I describe below, I will take rewards to be
numbers of dollars (which could be negative), and assume that V($x) = $x,
but this need not be true in general.
2including one [5] by the present author [advertisement]
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According to the MWI, after a quantum event the state of the world is
a superposition of branches, corresponding to the various possible outcomes
of the event. That state can be written
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci|ri〉.
where |ri〉 represents a branch in which outcome i had occurred and in which
the (descendant of the) agent has received reward ri, and where
∑
i |ci|
2 = 1.
The ”quantum weight” associated with ri, which I will write as w(ri), is |ci|
2;
according to the Born rule, this is the probability that the agent will receive
ri. For a game G, the quantum expectation of V is
〈V〉(G) =
∑
i
w(ri)V(ri),
where of course the rewards ri and the weights w(ri) on the right-hand-side
of this equation are those appropriate to the game G.
The agent is assumed to have a preference order for games; the D-W
program seeks to establish the DTBR by showing that the only rational
preference order is given by, for any games A and B, A is preferred to B
exactly when 〈V〉(A) > 〈V〉(B). To accomplish this, Wallace in ref. [2]
adopts several axioms which he argues any rational preference order must
obey. One of these is, in paraphrase,
Diachronic Consistency: Suppose that an agent plays a game
G, and that, for each i, his descendant in branch i has a choice
of game Hi or H
′
i
; then
i) If none of the descendants prefer H ′
i
to Hi , then the agent
must not prefer playing G followed by H ′
i
to playing G followed
by Hi.
ii) If in addition at least one descendant prefers Hi to H
′
i
, then
the agent must prefer playing G followed by Hi to playing G
followed by H ′
i
.
Another axiom which Wallace argues to be required by rationality is
Solution Continuity: If the agent prefers game G to game G′,
and if game H is sufficiently close to G and H ′ sufficiently close
to G′, then the agent must prefer H to H ′.
The three agents I will define below do not obey the DTBR. The Egali-
tarian will violate diachronic consistency, and the Optimist will violate both
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diachronic consistency and solution continuity; of course the implication of
this is, if these two agents are judged to be rational, that these axioms are
not really required by rationality. The Stoic will respect all the axioms
adopted in [2].
The Egalitarian: The Egalitarian wishes that all of his descendants
fare as equally as is possible. Unlike the egalitarian described by Greaves [6],
this Egalitarian does not try to apply equal weights to all branches; instead,
at least in the cases in which the 〈V〉 of two games are equal, he prefers the
game which makes the differences of the rewards received by his descendants
smaller. So, for example, he would prefer game A (receive either $2 or $3,
with equal quantum weight) to game B (receive either $1 or $4, with equal
quantum weight) even though 〈V〉 is the same for those two games; thus he
would violate the DTBR.
Wallace would say that the Egalitarian is irrational, because in some
cases he would not be diachronically consistent. Suppose that the Egalitar-
ian has two immediate descendants whom I will call D1 and D2 (each of
whom is an Egalitarian, of course) and that these respectively have descen-
dantsD1-junior andD2-junior. The senior Egalitarian would wantD1-junior
and D2-junior to fare equally; they are, so to speak, his grandchildren. But
neither D1 nor D2 would have that concern; D1-junior is not a descendant of
D2, and D2-junior is not a descendant of D1. The fact that the senior Egal-
itarian has a concern which none of his descendants share could certainly
lead to a violation of diachronic consistency. But is it irrational?
In fact, if an agent’s preferences are to obey the DTBR, he must have
concerns not shared by any of his descendants; he must be concerned with
the quantum weights of the ensuing branches, while his descendants will
not be (do you even know the quantum weight of the branch you inhabit?).
In real life, it is not remarkable, and not considered irrational, to have
concerns which one knows that ones descendants (or one’s future self) will
not share, and in some cases this does lead to a violation of diachronic
consistency. Wallace himself describes an example of this, and then concedes
that “isolated occurrence” of violation of diachronic consistency might not
be irrational, but he asserts that “In the presence of widespread, generic
violation of diachronic consistency, agency in the Everett universe is not
possible at all.” One might disagree with this assertion (as Kent [4] does),
but in any case it does not seem a sufficient reason to adopt an axiom which
forbids any violation. Wallace does point out that “Everettian branching
is ubiquitous; agents branch all the time (trillions of times per second, at
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least...)”, but it is not clear how this changes anything. Surely an agent is
not called upon to make decisions trillions of times per second, so it seems
that it would take more than the requirement of rationality to forbid him
to make decisions which might occasionally lead to a violation of diachronic
consistency.
The Optimist: Consider rewards to be monetary, and set V($x) = $x.
Now define, for a game A, LR(A) to be the largest of the rewards offered by
A. Then the Optimist prefers game A to game B when LR(A) > LR(B).
This Optimist is similar to the “future self elitist” discussed in [4] except
that he does not resolve ties.
Could this be a rational preference? Suppose, first, that the Optimist
were so frail that he would immediately expire if, when playing a game A, he
suffered the disappointment of not receiving LR(A). This would mean that
all of his surviving descendants would certainly be in the LR(A) branch,
so why should he care about the rewards in other branches? (Note that
if he were this frail but subscribed to some “one-world” interpretation of
quantum theory, his preferences would be quite different; it is the MWI
which guarantees that he will have a descendant in the LR(A) branch.)
Note also that if in fact he was not so frail, but merely believed that he was,
his preferences would equally seem to be rational.
Admittedly, it is somewhat far-fetched to imagine that a person would
be, or even believe himself to be, frail in just this way. On the other hand,
there are less far-fetched circumstances in which the Optimist’s preferences
would seem rational. So let us allow that the Optimist will have surviving
descendants on several branches, and suppose that he was convinced by
Saunders [7] that the MWI implies that he should expect to become one of
his descendants; then he might believe that he would be lucky enough to
become the one in the LR(A) branch.3 It might be callous of him to not
be concerned about the rewards received by all the other descendants, but
callousness is not usually considered to be irrational.
In some cases, the Optimist’s preferences can violate Wallace’s axiom of
diachronic consistency. Suppose that after playing a game G he had two
descendants called D1 and D2, and that D1 could play either H1 (which
3Just as in the classical case, the Optimist must be careful not to fall victim to a Dutch
book. He would want to play (i.e. prefer to the null game) a game in which a coin was
tossed and he would win $1 if the coin showed heads but would lose $2 if the coin showed
tails. Likewise, he would want to play a game in which he would win $1 if tails, but lose
$2 if heads. However, he would not want to play both games if they depended on a single
coin toss, because for the combined game LR is negative
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rewards $2 with certainty) or H ′1 (which rewards $1 with certainty), while
D2 could play either H2 or H
′
2 (each of which rewards $3 with certainty).
Then D1 would prefer H1 to H
′
1, D2 would be neutral between H2 and H
′
2,
but the Optimist would be diachronically inconsistent because he would not
prefer G followed by H to G followed by H ′. In this case the Optimist would
be confident that he would become D2, so it does not seem irrational for
him not to care about what D1 wants.
The preferences of the Optimist also violate Wallace’s axiom of solution
continuity, as can be seen from the following example: Suppose the Optimist
is choosing between the following two games:
game A := receive $1 with certainty, and
game Bǫ := receive $1 or $0, with w($1) = ǫ and w($0) = 1− ǫ.
According to the strategy I have defined for him, the Optimist should prefer
A if ǫ = 0, but should be indifferent between A and Bǫ for any ǫ > 0. How-
ever, in justifying his axiom of solution continuity, Wallace points out “Any
discontinuous preference order would require an agent to make arbitrarily
precise distinctions between different acts, something which is not physically
possible”. In particular, this means that the Optimist’s strategy could not,
in practice, be carried out, because it is not physically possible to know with
infinite precision what game is being played. Let me call this the “precision
limitation” and agree with Wallace that it implies that our Optimist can
never know that ǫ is precisely zero.
One possible response to the precision limitation is to shrug “So who
cares?” After all, the title of Wallace’s paper is “A formal proof of the Born
rule...”, not “A practical guide to selecting games”. According to the MWI,
no such guide is needed; the MWI is deterministic, so arguably it implies
that the agent is not free to make any choices at all, which would mean that
no strategy is in practice possible. Wallace is of course aware of this problem;
he responds to it in a footnote, where he writes “...we can talk about rational
strategies even if an individual agent is not free to choose whether or not his
strategy is rational.” Yes we can, but if we are just talking about strategies,
without requiring that an agent could actually pursue them, it is not clear
why we should limit our talk to strategies which, according to some other,
non-deterministic theory, an agent might actually pursue.
The Stoic, described below, offers a different response to the precision
limitation; he will exploit that limitation to define a strategy which will
satisfy all of Wallace’s axioms, but which nevertheless will be in conflict
with the DTBR.
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The Stoic: For the Stoic, I again take V($x) = $x. Also, just like the
Optimist, the Stoic always expects to receive the greatest award offered by
any game he plays; so, like the Optimist, if asked to choose between the two
games considered above:
game A := receive $1 with certainty, and
game Bǫ := receive $1 or $0, with w($1) = ǫ and w($0) = 1− ǫ,
he will have no preference in the case in which he knows that ǫ > 0. But
the Stoic is also impressed by the fact that the precision limitation means
that he can never know that ǫ = 0. Suppose that he knows that the value
of ǫ lies within a certain interval, but he does not know where within that
interval it does lie. If the point 0 is not included in the interval, that means
he is certain that ǫ 6= 0; if the point 0 is included in the interval, then, since
0 is just a single point, he still thinks that, with probability one, ǫ 6= 0. So it
is reasonable for him in either case to act as if ǫ 6= 0; that is, he will always
be neutral between games A and Bǫ.
Another way to understand the Stoic is to imagine that a bookmaker
were to say to him “You can choose A or B0; if you choose A, I will toss a
fair coin and give you $1 whichever way the coin lands; if you choose B0 I
will toss a fair coin and give you $0 whichever way the coin lands.” The Stoic
would rather receive $1 than $0. However, he thinks “The bookmaker must
have at least $1 in his pocket, so that he could give it to me if I were to choose
A. If I choose B0, he is not obligated to give me anything. Nevertheless,
there will be some branch, albeit with minuscule quantum weight, in which
the money which began in the bookmaker’s pocket winds up, via quantum
tunneling, in my pocket. Therefore if I choose B0, it is possible that I will
receive at least $1.” Then, like the Optimist, he expects that if he chooses
B0 he will receive at least $1. Since he also expects that if he chooses A he
will receive at least $1, he is neutral between A and B0.
We can easily understand what will be the Stoic’s preference order in
general, if we imagine that there is a finite award which is the greatest
award that any game can offer. Write that award $max, and think of it as
“all the money in the universe”4. The Stoic considers that following any
game there will be a branch in which $max has tunneled into his pocket,
4This might seem inconsistent, since if you gain $max in each of two games you have
gained 2($max) in the combined game. This seeming inconsistency is due to the simplifi-
cation of letting the utility of a monetary reward equal the reward, and that need not be
true. If you already have all the money you could possibly use, it is arguably no better
to have twice that amount, so it is not inconsistent to assume there is a reward so great
that its utility is at least as large as that of any reward.
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and he then expects that, whatever game he might choose, he will receive
$max. So his preference order for games is:
Stoic preference order: All games are preferred equally.
The Stoic acts as if all games have a non-zero value of w($max). If all games
really did have a small-but-non-zero value of w($max), that would violate
another of Wallace’s axioms, the one called “branching availability”. Per-
haps this is a good reason to question that axiom also, but for the purposes
of this note is is simpler to agree that there are games for which w($max) is
precisely zero but that, due to the precision limitation, an agent can never
know that he is playing one of them. Classically, it is also true that one can
never be completely certain about the possible outcomes of a game; if you
play a game in which you are supposed to gain $1, it might happen that the
$1-bill you are given turns out to be an old and rare one which is worth $106.
Usually one would judge that the chance of that happening is so small that
it need not be considered when deciding whether or not to play that game.
In the quantum case, the Born rule implies that branches with minuscule
quantum weight can be neglected, but this cannot be assumed in an argu-
ment meant to justify the Born rule5—and invoking the solution-continuity
axiom does not help, since the Stoic’s preferences do satisfy that axiom.6 In
fact, these preferences satisfy all of the axioms which Wallace has assumed
in [2]. On the other hand, the Stoic acts in flagrant disregard for the DTBR.
The Born-rule expectations for $ will be greater for game A than for game
Bǫ defined above (and will remain greater even if a sufficiently-small con-
tribution due to $max is included in the calculation of those expectations)
but the Stoic does not prefer playing A to playing Bǫ. Even if he knows
that the quantum weight for $max is, say, approximately 10−100, he acts as
if that outcome had probability one.
But what about Wallace’s proof? The result that Wallace does prove is
given in eq. 30 of [2]; it says that there is an essentially unique function u of
rewards such that the agent prefers a game G to a game H exactly when the
quantum expectation of u on G is greater than the quantum expectation of
u on H. This result is certainly correct for the Stoic: for him u is a constant,
5As noted by Price [3]
6I imagine that Wallace’s intention in adopting a continuity axiom is to force branches
of exquisitely-small quantum weight to be neglected, which in the example above would
mean roughly that the case of very small ǫ must be treated the same as the case in which
ǫ is zero. However, the Stoic turns this intention upside down: he satisfies continuity by
treating the case in which ǫ is zero just as he does the case of very small ǫ.
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the quantum expectation of a constant is the same for any game, and the
Stoic does not prefer any game to any other.
However, to get from this result to the DTBR requires the identification
of the function u with the agent’s preference for rewards V. This might
seem to be almost a matter of definition, since usually one can establish an
agent’s preference for rewards from his preference for games; for example, if
the agent does not care whether he plays a game in which he surely receives
a reward r or a game in which he surely receives a reward s, it usually follows
that he does not care whether he receives r or s. But for the Stoic in the
MWI, this does not follow; as I have defined him, he would prefer receiving
$1 to receiving $0, but he does not prefer game A to game B0, because he
expects (rightly or wrongly) to receive $max from either game.
One can also imagine a classical situation where an agent’s preference
for rewards does not follow from his preference for games: Suppose that an
agent is offered a choice between two games, called G and H; one game will
surely pay him $1 and the other surely pay him $0, but the agent does not
know which of these games is the one which pays $1. Then, although he
might prefer to receive the $1, he would have no reason to prefer the game
called G over the game called H. That is, decision theory applies in the usual
way under the assumption that the agent does know the rules of the games
he is offered. The Stoic’s situation is analogous to this classical one; because
of the precision limitation, he can never know that he is being offered a game
in which w($max) is precisely zero. That is why his preference for rewards
does not follow from his preference for games.
In order to justify the Born rule from the MWI, we might therefore want
to adopt some additional axiom in order to rule out the Stoic, which would
mean adopting an axiom not because it was actually required by rationality,
but rather because it seemed to be required in order to justify the Born
rule. This might be necessary in order to reach the goal of identifying a set
of assumptions which, when bundled together with the MWI, would lead
to the Born rule. However, it would not accomplish what I take to be the
original goal of the D-W program, which is to derive the Born rule from the
MWI with no additional assumptions whatsoever.7
Acknowledgement: I would like to acknowledge the hospitality of the
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, where this work was done.
7Elsewhere [8] Wallace has written “The formalism is to be left alone. . . unitary quan-
tum mechanics need not be supplemented in any way”.
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